Judiciary vs. Parliament: The Constitutional Battle for Supremacy.

India’s democracy is witnessing a moment of reckoning—one that pits the pillars of governance against one another in an increasingly public showdown. Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar’s recent remarks during the closing ceremony of the Rajya Sabha Internship Programme have triggered a heated national debate. His words were not mere observations; they were a pointed critique of the growing influence of the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, in areas traditionally reserved for the legislature and executive.

In his address, Dhankhar questioned whether the judiciary is overstepping its mandate and positioning itself as a “Super Parliament.” This striking phrase is now at the heart of a conversation India has been hesitant to have for too long: who really holds the reins of democracy in this country?

The Provocation: Courts as Lawmakers?

Vice President Dhankhar’s statements come in the wake of a Supreme Court directive that the President must act within three months on bills forwarded by Governors—a move some view as judicial activism crossing into executive territory. “We cannot create a situation where courts give instructions to the President,” Dhankhar asserted. His concern: the judiciary, once a neutral umpire, is not just adjudicating the rules of the democratic game but playing the match itself.

What makes his critique more potent is the implicit accusation that this power play is undermining democratic accountability. “There has never been such a democracy in India where judges work as lawmakers, executives, or super parliamentarians,” he said—marking a direct challenge to what some see as judicial overreach in recent years.

A Country of Laws—or of Judges?

Dhankhar’s warning taps into a long-standing unease about the doctrine of basic structure—a judicial invention not found in the written Constitution, yet one that gives the courts sweeping power to strike down legislation. Critics argue this has allowed unelected judges to veto the will of elected representatives.

This concern is not new. Legal scholars and parliamentarians alike have often debated whether the judiciary’s self-appointed role as the guardian of the Constitution is drifting into an arena where it also becomes its interpreter, enforcer, and sometimes, author. While judicial review is a cornerstone of federal democracies, its unchecked expansion risks turning the court into an unelected super-legislature.

The Credibility Crisis: Corruption and Nepotism?

Amid this constitutional tussle is a darker narrative—of erosion of trust. Allegations of favoritism in appointments, unaccountable conduct, and selective outrage have dogged the judiciary. Critics point to cases where controversial judges have retired with no transparency over their wealth or actions. “Why can’t the assets of judges be made public?” some ask. “Why is there no system to hold them accountable, as we do with politicians or bureaucrats?”

Such sentiments may be provocative, even uncomfortable, but they speak to a growing perception that justice has become both elitist and transactional. As one commentator starkly put it: “Justice has become a business. If you don’t have money, you can’t get it.”

People vs. Constitution: Who is Supreme?

Perhaps the most philosophically charged element of Dhankhar’s speech is his challenge to the commonly held belief that “the Constitution is supreme.” “No,” he says, “in a democracy, the people are supreme. They can change the Constitution whenever they want.” This view flips the often-repeated mantra and argues that parliamentary supremacy should override judicial finality.

It’s a provocative claim, but one that has deep resonance in other democracies. In the UK, for example, Parliament is sovereign. In the U.S., judicial review is part of a carefully calibrated system with checks and balances—not the final word on every matter.

The Bigger Picture: Judicial Review or Judicial Rule?

The original intent of judicial review was to ensure the constitutionality of laws—not to dictate policy or direct executive action. Yet, today’s Supreme Court routinely weighs in on everything from environmental policy to administrative timelines. Can courts decide whether diesel vehicles can run, or if stubble burning should stop? Should they regulate temple processions or riverfront gatherings?

This kind of judicial micromanagement, critics argue, strays far beyond adjudication and into governance itself. And when courts begin issuing deadlines to the President or interpreting powers that belong to the elected branches, the constitutional equilibrium is at risk.

A Necessary Reckoning

Jagdeep Dhankhar’s comments may be uncomfortable, even unsettling, but they are not unfounded. They reflect a growing concern across political and legal circles that India’s constitutional architecture—designed to ensure a balance of powers—is being reshaped in ways not foreseen by its framers.

Respect for the judiciary is non-negotiable. But unchecked judicial power—without accountability, transparency, or democratic legitimacy—can be just as dangerous as legislative tyranny. As India matures as a democracy, it must confront these uncomfortable truths. The time for polite silence is over. What is needed now is honest, courageous debate—and perhaps, a course correction.

Because democracy is not just about the supremacy of institutions—it’s about the supremacy of balance.